A. Introduction
The main objective of the paper is to extend the basic model of Keynes's General Theory to explain medium and long-run economic performance in developed capitalist economies. In this way we seek to deepen our understanding of the macro economic processes that account for differences in macro performance over time and between economies at similar stages of their economic development. It naturally starts from a conviction that Keynes's original model of short-run economic fluctuations is the appropriate foundation for further macroeconomic research. In the process of extending the traditional Keynesian model we frequently compare our views with those of the mainstream macroeconomic theory.
The natural candidate for comparison is an extended version of New Keynesian macroeconomics, now popular in the textbooks (Blanchard and Melino,1999; Ragan and Lipsey, 2005; Mankiw & Scarth, 2001 ). In the 1980s, it was a well-received microeconomic research programme whose main goal was to replace perfectly competitive neoclassical markets with imperfectly competitive Keynesian ones. This was followed by the incorporation of NAIRU analysis for modelling the short-run and eventually by the adoption of a long-run growth analysis, although this was not integrated with the short run analysis. These subsequent developments together with the earlier micro analysis we designate mainstream macroeconomic theory, to be compared with our extended Keynesian macro theory.
To better grasp the essential differences between the two views, the theoretical models are presented in the form of a limited number of propositions, or a core, achieved by selecting from each of their theoretical frameworks those parts which make it 'usable'. For example, the 1 What constitutes the usable core in macroeconomic theory was the theme of a symposium 'Is there a Core of Practical Macroeconomics that We Should all Believe? ', American Economic Review, Papers & Proceedings, No.2, 1997 . See especially papers by Blanchard (1997) and Solow (1997) .
2 Comparable data are not available for all eighteen countries prior to 1960. The year 2000 marks the end of the last complete cycle. The common end points for the periods shown in the table are those published in OECD Historical Statistics. selection from our extended Keynesian framework includes propositions that explain the broad historical tendencies of macro economic development, the 'stylized facts' in Kaldor's terminology.
In addition, our core theory includes the propositions that provide a coherent theoretical basis to derive useful policy principles.
1 A similar process is used to select the mainstream core. Before undertaking these tasks, the next section takes up some of the broad historical tendencies we expect any macroeconomic core theory to be capable of explaining. Given the casual disregard for the historical record in so much of current macroeconomic theory, a consistency with the historical record is stressed throughout the paper. Following a background discussion of historical developments, in Section C we initiate the comparative discussion beginning with the alternative short-run theories.
B. The Stylized Facts
Our study deals with the advanced capitalist economies in the period following World
War II until the end of the century for which comparable data are available. Table 1 summarizes short-run and longer-run macroeconomic developments of eighteen advanced capitalist economies from 1960 until the end of the century, the 1990s being the last short-run period for which comparable data are available. 2 [Table 1 goes about here] The total period divides into five short cycles in GDP with common end points for each cycle indicated at the top row of the table. Rates of unemployment, inflation and labour productivity growth are given for each of the countries in our sample during each short-run GDP cycle period. A noticeable feature in the table is the strong negative correlation between unemployment and productivity growth rates from one 3 GDP cycle to the next in all economies. Considering the entire post World War II period, the countries separate into three groups, those with low rates of unemployment throughout the entire period with the exception of one short-run period at the end of the century (the low unemployment countries}; those with relatively high rates of unemployment throughout the entire period (the high unemployment countries) and a third group in which low unemployment until the mid-1970s was followed by high unemployment thereafter (the low-high unemployment countries).
The data also show two lengthy episodes distinguished by their differing performance, the Golden Age of low unemployment and rapid growth , followed by what we designate the Age of Decline (1974 Decline ( -2000 , an episode of high unemployment, slow growth and high rates of inflation in the 1970s. The first episode includes the first two short-run GDP cycles and the second includes the last three successive within-episode cycles. The overall average rate of unemployment for the 18 economies during the Golden Age was 2.3 per cent. Adopting 3 per cent as the full employment rate of unemployment (although choosing a rate twice the actual average rate would not alter the conclusions), Table 1 brings out clearly the exceptional unemployment and inflation records in the first episode for all but four of the economies, the high unemployment group. This was also a period of rapid expansion of the welfare state, especially outside the United States, leading to a marked reduction in poverty rates and the inequality in income distributions.
The period from the mid-1970s to the end of the century was one of economic decline.
Accelerating inflation rates in the late 1960s and early 1970s were followed by persistent inflation problems in spite of restrictive aggregate demand policies and rising unemployment rates. From the first short-run cycle in the table to that of the 1990s short-run cycle, the overall average unemployment rate rose approximately 350 per cent. Within these average figures there were exceptions, as most of the time the five low unemployment countries continued to experience low 4 3 Note that together the two medium run episodes viewed in succession constitute a long run. unemployment rates. In general rates of growth of labour productivity traced out a rapid growthslow growth pattern from the Golden Age to the Age of Decline.
Such a marked historical shift in macro performance from the Golden Age to the Age of Decline did not go unnoticed among macro economists (e.g., Blanchard 1997a Blanchard , 1997b Solow, 1997; 2000 and Cornwall, chs 10 and 11, 2001) . Nevertheless its prominence failed to induce mainstream macro theorists to include the medium run as a third analytical category when modelling the post World War II era.
3 Two additional stylized facts also stand out. From one short-run period to the next, in every economy there was a strong negative correlation between unemployment rates and the growth rates of productivity. Second, the capitalist economies were spared a repeat of the Great Depression. While there was a noticeable increase in unemployment rates from the first medium-run episode to the second, macroeconomic performance after the mid-1970s did not indicate a major disconnect between forces driving the rates of growth of aggregate demand and aggregate supply. Finally, changes in the average unemployment rate from one short-run period to the next indicate mild cyclical movements.
Most of the remainder of the paper discusses the short-run, medium-run and long-run models we use to explain these stylized facts and compares our explanations with those of the mainstream core.
C. Short-Run Theory
The mainstream core
Our explanation of the five short run cyclical movements depicted in Table 1 is better understood by contrasting two theories of the short-run outlined in Solow (1997 This was a special case of an expectations augmented Phillips curve in which the expected rate of inflation variable was assumed to have a coefficient of one, i.e., real wage bargaining was assumed. This endowed the short-run theory with a unique short-run equilibrium, the unemployment rate at which the rate of inflation was constant.
In its original formulation NAIRU theory was embedded in the neoclassical competitive framework of flex-price labour and product markets and invisible hands. A well known key property of this version of the NAIRU theory was it came with an indicator of the achievement of its unique equilibrium, when the economy was at full employment. Another favourable property of this NAIRU equilibrium was its stability. Not only did any rate of unemployment different from the NAIRU set in motion accelerating or decelerating rates of inflation., but when out of equilibrium the price mechanism (the invisible hand) automatically generated the necessary increases or decreases of aggregate demand to ensure a steady convergence back to the full employment NAIRU equilibrium. Finally, this equilibrium was one determined solely on the supply side. Aggregate demand played a passive role in New Keynesian short-run analysis. To put this in more technical terms, the NAIRU acted as a 'strong attractor'. Any disturbance of the equilibrium set in motion mechanisms bringing the system back to its unique equilibrium.
2. An evaluation of NAIRU theory
Our main concern in this section is whether NAIRU analysis provides an understanding of the forces generating the short run movements in macro activity and insights for developing useful policy principles. Certainly the original NAIRU models were formulated in unrealistic terms and are not acceptable. The continuance of high rates of involuntary unemployment in the 6 4 The standard New Keynesian short-run model has been updated in the 'new consensus' theory of inflation targeting. For a general critique of NAIRU analysis which questions the stability of equilibrium in such models see Sawyer (2001) and Setterfield (forthcoming).
Age of Decline led to growing dissatisfaction with the competitive model as a support system and to major reformulations. While this involved discarding the neoclassical competitive framework (as lacking in descriptive value) and replacing it with imperfectly competitive fix-price labour and product markets, the real wage bargaining assumption was retained. Discarding the competitive framework introduced an element of realism into the analysis, but did nothing to resolve the problem posed by the NAIRU being unobservable. Reliance on econometric estimates of the NAIRU has its own problems. For example, econometric work revealed that with only minor changes in model specification, sample period used and definitions of the variables, a wide range of NAIRU estimates are generated (Setterfield et al.) . In all other cases changes in short-run movements in output and unemployment would be difficult to interpret and NAIRU theory would not provide a guide to policy. Nevertheless there has been an inclination to interpret any increase (decrease) in the rate of inflation and fall (rise) in the rate of unemployment as occurring within the context of a fixed NAIRU. Similarly any change in the rates of inflation and unemployment in the same direction is attributed to a shift in the NAIRU (Ball, 1992) .
These interpretive and policy problems are magnified by the absence of an invisible hand guaranteeing convergence to the NAIRU equilibrium. Thus, the studies to determine whether there existed adjustment mechanisms ensuring convergence found the usually cited mechanisms, Pigou and Keynes effects, were not powerful enough to ensure convergence (Tobin,1993) . 4 For this reason alone movements in output and unemployment cannot be interpreted unambiguously as part of a convergence process back to the NAIRU; they may be part of the system's endogenous dynamics.
Further empirical and theoretical work, and the continued high rates of involuntary unemployment extending into the 1970s and beyond, raised questions about the appropriateness 7 5 A related model in which the coefficient in the expected rate of inflation variable varies with the current rate of unemployment has been developed by Duesenberry (1991) . of the real wage bargaining assumption. Theoretical work has challenged the argument that anything other than real wage bargaining imputes irrational behaviour to wage bargainers (Sawyer, op. cit.) . Thus, the notion that labour is always in a position to determine its real wage has been challenged by those stressing the role of power in wage determination. Others have stressed that at low rates of inflation wage bargainers will be little concerned with current rates of price inflation. Only at high rates of inflation does labour bargain to protect its real wages (Akerlof et al.) . This latter view has been formalized in a two-track model of inflation in which the coefficient of the expected price inflation variable varies with the current rate of price inflation (Eckstein and Brinner, 1972; Cornwall, 1990) .
5 Over a range of high unemployment rates the Phillips curve is downward sloping but eventually turning vertical at a low threshold rate of inflation. Finally current writings argue that the NAIRU is subject to hysteresis, varying with recent movements in the unemployment rate. In this case it can no longer perform the role of an attractor ( Ball, op.cit.) .
In summary, according to NAIRU analysis the movement from one short-run period to the next in Table 1 should be understood as a movement through successive NAIRU constrained adjustment processes. From what has been said, this interpretation of events cannot be accepted.
Our conclusion is that NAIRU analysis provides little assistance in understanding the forces generating short-run movements in macro activity and in formulating useful policy principles. It cannot be a sound foundation for theory.
3 An extended Keynesian core Our preferred explanation of the short-run movements in Table 1 is strictly Keynesian, a decision ultimately based on the unacceptability of NAIRU analysis with its assumptions of real wage bargaining and supply determined equilibrium analysis. This rejection is not to argue that high rates of inflation in the real world can never be a serious problem with adverse implications.
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Indeed inflation has had this impact and the constraining influence of inflation on aggregate demand plays an important role in our short-run core model. However, it does so within a traditional Keynesian core which includes fix-price markets and a negatively sloped Phillips curves. Beginning at some high rate of unemployment, there will be a range of unemployment rates in which policy makers are allowed some choice between inflation-employment points.
Here aggregate demand determines equilibrium. However at some low rate of unemploymenthigh rate of inflation combination, the inflation rate becomes unacceptable to the authorities and this places a constraint on further increases in aggregate demand. Indeed at this particular unemployment rate involuntary unemployment may even be substantial, in which case it is necessary to think of the economy being subject to at least two possible constraints, one the inflation constraint and the other a physical constraint based on resource limitations. Another possible limitation on aggregate demand is a balance of payments constraint, whereby further increases in aggregate demand lead to unacceptable payments deficits and legal restrictions on stimulative fiscal policies. Following custom all of these constraints are referred to here as supply constraints.
With the concept of constraints on aggregate demand in mind, an extended short-run Keynesian core theory can be formulated in which 'fixed-price' markets are embedded in a macro system in which performance is driven by aggregate demand. In dynamic formulations, some form of Keynesian income-expenditure mechanism would be assumed, e.g., an acceleratormultiplier interaction, to model short-run dynamics. Thus In Table 1 unemployment (and output) performance from one short-run period to the next would be modelled as a succession of shortrun damped cycles in GDP. Each cycle traces the interactions of an income-expenditure model in a Keynesian system subject to possible aggregate demand constraints. As pointed in section B the five short-run periods in Table 1 Remarkably, mainstream macroeconomists have not adjusted their theory to recognize or account for this stylized fact common to all eighteen economies listed in Table 1 . To correct for this avoidable error and explain performance in the Age of Decline and the Golden Age, the traditional Keynesian core must be extended.
This starts with the recognition of the need for a political economy theory of aggregate demand in which aggregate demand policies and therefore the levels of aggregate demand and unemployment are endogenously determined. This is to be contrasted with the exogenous treatment of fiscal policy in Keynes' General Theory. Specifically, the theory is formulated so as to answer two questions. Why for a quarter of a century following World War II were the fiscal authorities on average willing to pursue aggregate demand policies sufficient to achieve full employment in most economies? Second, why during the subsequent episode were the authorities unwilling to provide, again on average, the aggregate demand stimuli required to prevent a deterioration of macroeconomic conditions ? The traditional Keynesian core provides no answer to either question; evidently something important has been omitted from the core.
To answer these questions, we extend the traditional Keynesian core theory and model the missing medium-run policy responses as the outcome of an interaction between the supply of and demand for full employment policies. The strength of demand for full employment policies is 6 For a more formal account of the theory see W. Cornwall, this volume. For an early explanation of policy outcomes stressing both demand and supply influences see Gordon (1975) .
determined by the distribution of political and economic power among organized interest groups.
The party control theory of economic policy is the most prominent of the models focussing on the demand side and will be adopted here. It offers a political economy explanation of fiscal policy choices and differences in unemployment rates in terms of the relative strength of right-wing and left-wing parties, a reflection of the relative distribution of power between capital and labour (e.g., Kalecki, 1971; Hibbs, 1987; Alesina et al, 1997) . According to this theory, labour is more willing than capital to trade price stability for lower unemployment; this preference is registered at the ballot box through its choice of political parties. From one episode to the next, differences in aggregate demand policies and unemployment are traced to shift in political power within the economy.
However, the impact of the distribution of political power can account only for the strength of demand for aggregate demand policies. The policies supplied by the authorities depend upon whether or not there are constraints that limit their policy options. For example, if full employment levels of aggregate demand are seen to generate unacceptable inflation or unsustainable payments deficits, less than full employment aggregate demand policies will be adopted. In the absence of such constraints on aggregate demand, the political economy theory of policy assumes the policy authorities will provide the necessary stimulus to achieve full employment . provided it is demanded by the electorate. When undesirable side effects of full employment are present, they are traced to unfavourable institutions, such as an adversarial industrial relations system or to an absence of institutions fostering strong export growth. An absence of such constraints on aggregate demand can be traced to a favourable set of the same institutions, allowing the authorities to foster full employment goals. The political economy theory of aggregate demand policy gives a deeper understanding of differences in unemployment performance shown in Table 1 . The Golden Age was an episode characterized by the absence of constraints on aggregate demand polices in most of the capitalist economies and the presence of an historically strong power position for labour relative to capital.
As a result both the willingness of the authorities to supply full employment policies and strong political demands for full employment policies were present, leading to low unemployment rates.
In the episode that followed the Golden Age, most of the economies found themselves faced with institutional constraints on expansionary aggregate demand policies. Full employment proved to be incompatible with other national goals such as politically acceptable rates of inflation or sustainable balance of payments positions. As well, in the Age of Decline there were additional constraints on pursuing full employment policies. Among the new constraints were the introduction of an international monetary system which deregulated international capital flows and increased flexibility of exchange rates. These contributed to a proliferation of restrictive policies and the rise of unemployment rates most everywhere. The Age of Decline was also an episode in which labour's power was weak compared to its relatively strong position in the Golden Age and this led to weak demands for low unemployment policies.
When these medium run episodes are considered in sequence, they form an historical period that can be modelled as a long-run theory of aggregate demand and unemployment. Each of the two episodes is a medium run in the economy's long-run development, beginning and ending with a marked change in unemployment rates. Each episode is therefore characterized by a given set of key institutions and distribution of power. A sustained radical alteration in performance signals the arrival of a new episode, characterized by new institutions or a new power distribution or both and a major shift in the dominant policy stance of the authorities. For example, the institutional shift from a cooperative industrial relations system to an adversarial one or a radical change in the international monetary system can lead to incompatibility of full 7 Kalecki's (1971) famous model of the political business cycle offers an alternative explanation of the interruption of an episode of strong aggregate demand, i.e. capital's ability to force governments to enact high unemployment policies.
8 An exception would seem to be New Growth Theory and its treatment of technical progress. In some models technical progress is endogenously determined on the supply side. However, as the text makes clear, the focus in our extended Keynesian model is on technical progress, as well as rates of growth of capital and labour, being determined on the demand side. employment with acceptable inflation rates or sustainable payments positions or both, and restrictive policies that would end a medium-run boom episode. A radical shift in the distribution of power is also a possible source of radical shift in macroeconomic policy and performance.
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While we have concentrated on the eighteen capitalist economies as a group, we emphasize that an acceptable explanation of unemployment trends in most of the individual economies listed in Table 1 can be modelled by our model of long-run aggregate demand and unemployment.
F. Endogenizing the Growth of Aggregate Supply
The focus until now has been on aggregate demand and its growth, yet growth involves a supply side as well. In the discussion of the stylized facts in Section B it was pointed out that the rise in unemployment rates from the Golden Age to the Age of Decline indicates a failure of aggregate demand to keep pace with potential aggregate supply. Fortunately, this shortfall of demand was not so great as to lead to something like the Great Depression of the 1930s. This would suggests mechanisms at work in the post-World War II period preventing a major divergence between rates of growth of demand and potential supply. Our second extension of the traditional Keynesian core argues that indeed there was a mechanism limiting divergence in these growth rates. Contrary to the traditional treatment of aggregate supply in growth theory, this mechanism was simply that the rate of growth of aggregate supply was importantly influenced by the rate of growth of demand.
8 To model this we endogenize the usual production function determinants, treating each as strongly influence by aggregate demand.
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In support of endogenizing supply, consider an economy operating at the full employment rate of unemployment and a standard rate of utilization of the capital stock.
First, consider the case in which inputs in the production process are 'given' and allow a small sustained increase in the rate of growth of aggregate demand. The following selection of responses from a real world catalogue of supply responses is assumed. According to Okun's law, the higher rates of growth of real demand will induce responses on the supply side in the form of higher rates of labour force participation, overtime shifts and a shift from part time to full-time work by some of those already employed. This demand-induced expansion of employment will be accompanied by higher utilization rates of existing physical capital. In addition the induced higher growth rate of output will lead to higher growth rates of productivity because of 'learning by doing' effects. The point is that even when the stocks of capital, labour and technology are assumed 'given', the elasticity of supply with respect to aggregate demand will be positive.
Demand influences the supply of output and productivity even in the short run.
Next consider an economy experiencing a period of prolonged strong growth in aggregate demand, such as the Golden Age. The cumulative effect of the increased capital utilization rates and tighter labour markets can be expected to have a pronounced and lasting impact on factor supplies and technical progress. For example, a sustained higher rate of growth of aggregate demand will pull labour out of low income elasticity-high productivity growth sectors, e.g., agriculture, to satisfy the now more rapid rates of growth of demand for labour in the industrial and service sectors. If this source of 'surplus labour' proves insufficient, the growing number of job vacancies will be filled by importing more labour from abroad. In this scenario, labour supply is endogenous and not part of the 'givens'.
The sustained additional stimulus to the growth rate of aggregate demand will also have a sustained positive effect on the growth rate of capital and the rate of introduction of new technologies, much of which will be technology transfer from the industrial leader(s). As Domar pointed out over half a century ago, investment generates output through the multiplier but also 14 leads to increases in maximum output and labour productivity by increasing the capital stock. By generating high growth rates of investment, capital and technical progress, high growth rates of aggregate demand also contribute to high rates of growth of maximum output and productivity.
Furthermore, during the Golden Age the induced high productivity effects of strong aggregate demand dampens inflationary pressure and helps sustain the strong demand policies.
Finally, it goes without saying that influences other than aggregate demand pressures affect the supply side categories and were contributing to the differences in rates of growth of output and, as shown in Table 1 , differences in rates of growth of productivity among countries and over time. Nevertheless, the important implication of arguments presented in this section is that strong sustained aggregate demand was a necessary condition, not only for the low unemployment rates, but also for the high growth rates of productivity and output during the Golden Age. Similarly, stagnant demand conditions have been a key factor accounting for the poor macroeconomic performance of the last two and a half decades.
G. A Keynesian Model of Unemployment and Growth
The discussion in the previous sections can be summarized as follows. First, In Sections D and E, we outlined how certain institutions and the distribution of power determined the dominant medium-run aggregate demand policy. This determined the overall strength of aggregate demand and the average unemployment rates in each episode and therefore in the longrun. Second. in the previous section we endogenized the supply side of our core model by assuming the usual production function categories are importantly influenced by aggregate demand. This is a key feature in the construction of a medium-run and long-run theory of aggregate supply. It complements the medium-run and long-run Keynesian models of aggregate demand and unemployment discussed. in Sections D and E.
With aggregate demand and the unemployment rate determined, and with due account taken of the exogenous factors influencing performance, the average growth rate of aggregate supply in each episode is determined. Together the medium-run and long-run unemployment and 
H. Summary
We have summarized two theoretical frameworks in the form of a limited number of propositions or a core. This was done in order to better focus on their relative merits on key issues at the same time as it advanced our views. The first criterion for the inclusion of a proposition in a core theory was that it make clearer the theory's explanation of the stylized facts of macro economic development. The second criterion adopted in constructing a core was that the selected propositions provide a theoretical basis for deriving useful policy principles. In concluding we pose the question 'Which Core Does Best?' and then evaluate the relative success of the core theories in achieving their assigned tasks. This is done for the short-run, medium-run and long-run periods.
Evaluating the merits of the mainstream short-run analysis is essentially determining the explanatory power and usefulness of NAIRU analysis in explaining events and deriving helpful policies. We concluded in Section C that NAIRU analysis provided little assistance in understanding short-run cycles or in formulating policies to achieve superior unemploymentinflation outcomes. The alternative short-run Keynesian theory rejected NAIRU analysis, and in our view correctly modeled short-run performance as the outcome of a Keynesian incomeexpenditure mechanism subject to constraints. The important issue in short-run analysis is 16 whether or not shocks to an ongoing dynamic process activate disturbance-amplifying tendencies.
Exploring these possibilities is better understood by modelling short-run movements in the just described Keynesian fashion and expanding the analysis by adding on additional features. For example, in a longer paper we would have given attention to the kind of mechanism needed for controlling speculative 'bubbles'.
Determining the relative merits of the extended Keynesian and mainstream core theories in explaining medium-and long-run events and generating useful policies is more straight forward. By way of contrast mainstream macro economics has restricted its analysis to a framework and core in which only short-run and long-run categories are recognized. As a result it has no theory to explain one of the outstanding stylized facts of the times, the alternating medium-run episodes, and has had to rely on a large number of ad hoc conjectures. Mainstream macroeconomists also insist on modelling the long run as a steady state balanced growth process.
We consider it inappropriate to model a long-run period of major shifts in institutions, power structures (and technologies), let alone an historical period comprising a succession of two radically different performance records, by an exponential. Indeed mainstream macroeconomists have often been careless, introducing an exponential to model the long-run tendencies when the choice of exponentials is not well-supported by history (Solow, 2003) .
A key policy implication of our medium-run and long-run analysis is that strong aggregate demand pressures have beneficial employment effects and also stimulate the rate of growth of productivity and aggregate supply. Policies to solve the unemployment problem are therefore doubly beneficial. Econometric studies (W. Cornwall, this volume) support the policy implications of our theoretical model. Current mainstream growth theories treat the growth of aggregate supply as independent of the rate of growth of aggregate demand, and in so doing overlooks a source of policy-induced higher growth.
Another key policy implication of our analysis is that stimulative aggregate demand policies are only a necessary condition for reducing high unemployment and slow growth.
9 The continuous output of comparative studies focussing on 'which economies work best'; attests to the importance of institutions, especially in the labour market.
Among the additional necessary conditions for recovery is the prior removal of constraints on stimulative aggregate demand policies. This entails the presence of 'full employment friendly' institutions that permit the simultaneous achievement of other macro goals, such as acceptable rates of inflation at full employment. In their absence 'useful' high employment policies require the simultaneous implementation of special types of institutional change policies.
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The data in Table 1 are useful for evaluating which policies are full employment friendly.
Note the economies fall into three groups: the 'low unemployment economies' with full employment in the Golden Age and in most of the subsequent short-run cycles; the 'high unemployment economies' with high unemployment rates both during and after the Golden Age; and the 'low-high unemployment economies' with full employment during the Golden Age followed by high unemployment. Case studies (Cornwall, 1990, ch. 5) provide evidence that in the Golden Age full employment economies tended to be those with above average amounts of government intervention in their labour markets and with strong unions. Furthermore, countries such as Canada and the United States, with weak unions and deregulated markets performed the worst.
Mainstream macroeconomists have had little to offer in the way of explaining differences in unemployment rates among countries in the Golden Age. Rather the mainstream theory policy principle that evolved focussed on explaining the decline in macro performance between the Golden Age and the Age of Decline. This attributed the deterioration to widespread increases in government intervention in the market and to the rising power of unions. Comparing countries, this policy principle asserted that, other things being equal, the greater the displacement of economies from the competitive ideal the greater their deterioration in performance, and the greater the need for radical corrective policies. Again the data in Table 1 and the evidence cited in the last paragraph cast serious doubt on the correctness of these policy principles.
I. Conclusions
When answering the question 'which core does best?' it is difficult to escape the conclusion that mainstream macroeconomic theory is caught in an unproductive supplydetermined equilibrium framework. Its short-run theory is dominated by the NAIRU and its longrun theory is essentially the adoption of an exogenous full employment supply constraint. An extra good dose of Keynes is the suggested remedy.
We say this in full awareness that our extended Keynesian analysis has its own weaknesses. As the term core suggests, we do not offer a complete or detailed theory, simply a foundation to support the detailed rebuilding of Keynesian macroeconomics. For example, our medium-run theory of aggregate demand and unemployment uses a very simple political economy theory of aggregate demand policy. Here, a research programme emphasising case studies can provide the detail needed to expand and refine the analysis. Indeed the growth of comparative studies of capitalist economies, focussing on 'which economies work best', is cause for optimism in this regard. For now, our focus has been to establish a broad direction for future research with a Keynesian heritage. 1960-1967 1968-1973 1974-1979 1980-89 1990- 
